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Reach Through Royalties as a Workaround
for Patent Exhaustion
by PATRICK HAGAN*
I. Intoduction
In the high stakes worlds of pharmaceuticals and integrated
circuits, an inventor of a new product that catches on stands to profit
handsomely. As with any endeavor that creates a large amount of
revenue, there is usually no shortage of claimants to some of the
credit for the invention, and thus some of the money. This article
discusses reach through royalties ("RTRs"), a method by which
inventors of patented "research tools" can exercise some claim over
the proceeds of these later inventions, and argues that this method
should be enforceable under patent law. Although research tools can
be defined very broadly, my analysis is concerned with patented
methods and products used in the process of inventing additional
patented products, such as a pharmaceutical.
II. Reach Through Royalties
A. Definition
"'Reach-through licensing' is licensing of technology/intellectual
property, typically patent rights, with royalties based on a percentage
of sales, where the licensed technology/intellectual property, such as
basic research, is not incorporated into the end product." Sometimes
the definition is confused with other types of license terms; one
reference to an agreement in which the licensee was required to grant
the licensor "the first rights to negotiate a license for any new
inventions or discoveries arising from [the] use of the Kit" was called
* Mr. Hagan received his J.D. from the University of California Hastings College of
the Law in 2009.
1. Thomas J. Kowalski, Reach-through licensing: A US Perspective, 6 J. OF COM.
BIOTECH. 349 (2000) available at http://pharmalicensing.com/public/articles/view/
963567614 396edffel32c5.
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a "'reach-through" agreement[]."' 2 In fact, this type of agreement is
called a "grantback." Later in the same article, however, the author
refers to "royalties on commercial products that may not appear for a
decade or more after the tool was actually used and then never be
used again in the actual making of the product." 4 This accurately
describes an RTR.
Another similar but distinguishable licensing scheme was that
adopted in 1982 for the "Cohen-Boyer" patent by patentees Stanford
University and the University of California. The licensing provisions
were similar to those of an RTR in that the royalty amounts
depended on future sales; however, royalties were computed on the
actual use of the patented method in the manufacturing of a new
product, not just use during the discovery phase. As such, the royalty
computation did not "reach through" the patented product to another
product.
Like the Cohen-Boyer license, most biotech RTRs involve only a
license to the research tool itself.' The focus of this article is on a
rarer breed: the sales of patented products, whose use is also subject
to a license enforceable through an infringement suit. In light of the
doctrine of patent exhaustion, such a situation may seem impossible.
However, there is at least one accepted situation in which such a
license term is effectively enforceable under patent law, and I argue
that RTRs should be another.
B. Legal Considerations
As a threshold matter, it should be noted that RTRs in general
should not be prohibited as per se patent misuse or an antitrust
2. Naomi Freundlich, Will Increasingly Aggressive Licensing Terms on Research
Tool Patents Hurt Basic Research?, SIGNALS, June 4, 1998, http://www.signalsmag.com/
signalsmag.nsf/O/B931 DE6BB4A15AE788256618005B6335.
3. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N. ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY §5.6 (Apr. 6, 1995), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf ("A grantback is an arrangement
under which a licensee agrees to extend to the licensor of intellectual property the right to
use the licensee's improvements to the licensed technology").
4. Freundlich, supra note 2.
5. Margaret Young, The Legacy of Cohen-Boyer, SIGNALS, June 11, 1998,
http://www.signalsmag.com/signalsmag.nsf/O/B7367CO99E624AFE8825662000609D01.
6. Id. The question still arises, as with RTRs, as to whether violation of these
licensing terms could have subjected licensees to infringement suits or merely breach of
contract suits.
7. Email from David Highet, Vice President and Chief Intellectual Property
Counsel, Becton, Dickinson and Company (on file with author).
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violation,' and that an RTR is not necessarily an impermissible
expansion beyond the scope of the patent.' Licensors can, at the very
least, enforce RTR provisions through breach of contract suits.
The doctrine of patent exhaustion is the primary limit on "use
restrictions" on a patented product that has been sold. A brief
examination of the current state of the doctrine in patent law will
show exactly how much of a limit it is. The Supreme Court's recent
decision in Quanta v. LG Electronics" announced a renewed
emphasis on the power of the doctrine, which holds that a patentee
loses all of his patent enforcement rights over a particular copy of
his patented product when he sells that copy. Stated in positive
terms, a patented product can be freely used by its buyer in any way
he sees fit.
In Quanta, the patentee argued that the license restricted buyers
who had acquired the patented product from a licensee from using
the product without separately licensing for this right directly with the
patentee. The Court disagreed, holding that once the product was
sold, the patentee lost all authority (at least under patent law) to
restrict the use of the product. The Court reiterated the rule from the
1942 case United States v. Univis Lens Co.: "Exhaustion is triggered
only by a sale authorized by the patent holder."' The two key words
in the rule are "authorized" and "sale." The significance of "sale"
will be discussed below. For now, it is enough to know that an
"authorized" sale is one that follows any restrictions the patent holder
places on the sale. Any sale that does not is "unauthorized," and
subjects the buyer of the product (and the licensee, if any, who sold
the product) to patent infringement liability if he or she uses it.1 This
restriction can be seen as an incomplete transfer to the licensee of the
bundle of rights granted by the Patent Act, specifically, the right to
sell. 14 The Quanta Court implicitly upheld the validity of this type of
restriction, as stated earlier in General Talking Pictures Corp. v.
8. Alfred Server, Reach-Through Rights and the Patentability, Enforcement, and
Licensing of Patents on Drug Discovery Tools, 1 HASTINGS SC. & TECH. L.J. 21, 65
(2009).
9. Id. at 102. Server also notes that Brulotte involved a sale which was apparently
unrestricted," and which should have triggered the exhaustion doctrine. The Court did
not address the issue. See id. at 94 n.203.
10. See id. at 62.
11. 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008).
12. 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
13. Id.
14. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
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Western Elec. Co. In General Talking Pictures, a patentee and a
licensee had agreed to a restriction on which third party buyers the
licensee could sell to. A sale by the licensee to a prohibited third
party would literally infringe the patent. This provided one answer to
the ultimate question of what types of restrictions could result in
infringement liability for buyers and/or licensees. Unfortunately,
Quanta Court merely held that the facts involved were not similar to
those in General Talking Pictures, and offered little, even in dicta, in
the way of general affirmative guidance on other restrictions.
Perhaps more relevant to the RTR situation is that of "single use
only" restriction on the buyer, which was dealt with in Mallinckrodt v.
Medipart," an earlier Federal Circuit decision. The Federal Circuit
concluded the restriction was valid, calling it "an express[]
condition[]" of the sale." The Quanta Court did not offer any specific
guidance on this restriction, either, which is unfortunate, as it appears
that the patentee in Quanta "took full advantage" of the Mallinckrodt
holding in crafting its license." Some have argued that, at the time it
was decided, Mallinckrodt was already a departure from established
Supreme Court precedent and that in light of Quanta, it can be
considered dead law." One thing is certain, however: the facts in
Mallinckrodt approximate those in Quanta much more closely than
those in General Talking Pictures. However, even assuming
Mallinckrodt is no longer good law,2() RTRs aren't "use" restrictions
on products that have been sold, and thus can't be held to fail to
prevent exhaustion on that ground, either.
The Quanta Court did cite, along with Univis, several examples
of restrictions that have not allowed protection from patent
exhaustion;2 however, there are no examples in Justice Thomas' four-
paragraph history of the doctrine of patent exhaustion (two of which
are devoted to Univis) of restrictions that were allowed.22 This author
15. 305 U.S. 124, 127 (1938).
16. 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
17. LG Electronics. v. Bizcom Electronics, 453 F.3d 1364, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
18. See Harold C. Wegner, Post-Quanta, Post-Sale Patentee Controls, 7 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 682, 690 (2008).
19. Thomas G. Hungar, Observations Regarding the Supreme Court's Decision in
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. Lg Electronics, Inc., 49 IDEA 517, 529 (2008-09).
20. Id. at 530.
21. Quanta v. LG Electronics, 128 S. Ct. at 2116. (discussing Bauer & Cie v.
O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1913)); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg.
Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917).
22. 316 U.S. 241, 241 (1942).
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is not aware even of dicta in any Supreme Court case that hints at
what sorts of restrictions may theoretically be allowed to insulate a
patent from exhaustion.
One possibility is that the General Talking Pictures restriction
could be manipulated to transform an authorized sale into an
unauthorized sale the moment that the buyer violated the use
restriction. The idea is that a patentee could insert into the license a
contractual "condition precedent" that the product would only be
used by the buyer in the permitted fashion. Although the Court has
never directly addressed the question, at least one commentator does
not think this is possible.2
As may be gleaned from the above discussion, Quanta is notable
for what it didn't say. In addition to shedding very little light on the
issue of restrictions on sales of patented products, the Court did not
offer any affirmative pronouncements on the mere contractual
enforceability of use restrictions, stating that the patentee was not
"necessarily" precluded from pursuing contractual remedies.24 One
concern is whether such a provision would amount to patent misuse.2
C. RTRs as a Workaround to Patent Exhaustion
Recall the postponement of the discussion, above, of "sale" in
the rule of Univis, as well as the wording of Mallinckrodt. How else
could "use" restrictions be characterized to comply with current law?
Hungar points out that "it seems reasonable to predict that some
patent holders may attempt to avoid the impact of Quanta by
restructuring sales transactions as licenses, leases, consignments or
bailments in which title does not pass to the consumer." 26 In such a
case, a license may be structured to contemplate an eventual sale.
Such sales of real property can be subject to a condition precedent.
An RTR can be considered a condition precedent of a sale, with the
licensee promising to pay money in the future in exchange for
eventually acquiring title to the product. The patentee promises to
allow use of the product prior to the sale in exchange for the user's
promise to buy, which necessarily requires compliance with the
condition precedent. Without such a promise, the user could simply
decide that he or she does not want title, thereby refusing to pay the
23. Hungar, supra note 19, at 540.
24. 128 S. Ct. at 2122 n.7. The patentee did not claim breach of contract.
25. Server, supra note 8; Hungar, supra note 19.
26. Hungar, supra note 19, at 533 n.83.
27. Id. at 532 (citing early 20th century cases).
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RTR even though a sale is contemplated in the license. If the user
breaks this promise, even if he or she is no longer using the product,
this constitutes infringement in addition to breach of a contract.
This arrangement is slightly different from a use restriction,
dismissed above, which attempts to retroactively transform an
authorized sale into an unauthorized one. In the proposed
arrangement, the sale does not take place until the future royalties,
the true price for title to the product, are paid. If the licensee refuses
to pay the money, he or she never gets title to the product. While this
may be a moot issue by the time such a refusal is made, the user can
be held liable for infringement as a mere licensee. Although this
could be seen as "retroactively" changing the nature of the use of the
product, it is no different than any other contract in which duties of
performance by one party are not due simultaneously with or prior to
the other party's performance.
An RTR effectively turns royalties into a delayed payment plan
for use of a patented product, an idea that has some historical
precedent. In Brulotte v. Thys, a license that required royalty
payments based on use of a product after the patent's expiration was
held to be patent misuse;28 the dissent characterized the license
arrangement as a mere delayed payment plan, which the purchaser
used to "amortize the machine's fixed cost." 29 Judge Posner discussed
this idea approvingly in a recent case as well.3" A later case, Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, distinguished the collection of
royalties from their accrual, "recognizing ... that the payment of this
royalty could be postponed beyond [the expiration of the patent]."31
Coincidentally, the district court in Bayer v. Housey,3 as of early 2009
the only existing federal decision involving an RTR, suggested that
the RTR at issue could be seen as such a delayed payment plan,
although neither of the parties submitted evidence showing whether
royalties actually accrued after patent expiration.
Thus, RTRs on patented products are not really royalties at all:
they are just a way to compute the final sales price of the product.
Parties have wide latitude to negotiate for royalties, as long as they
28. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
29. Id. at 36 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
30. Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., 293 F.3d 1014, 1020 (7th Cir. 2002).
31. 395 U.S. 100, 136 (1969).
32. Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 467, 472-73 (D. Del. 2002).
33. Id. at 473.
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are not "exorbitant or oppressive" or "discriminatory." 34 So why
shouldn't parties have that same freedom to negotiate a final sales
price? Of course, "the effectiveness of such schemes will likely
depend on the extent to which the substance of the transaction is
consistent with its form. There is precedent for judicial
reexamination of such transactions to determine whether they are, in
substance, sales and should thus be treated accordingly."" In fact,
Justice Thomas performed this analysis in Quanta when he responded
to LGE's argument that the licensing agreement was a restriction on
the "right to sell": "LGE overlooks important aspects of the structure
of the Intel-LGE transaction. Nothing in the License Agreement
restricts Intel's right to sell its microprocessors and chipsets ....
Just because Intel gave notice to its customers of its inability to
sublicense the method patents did not mean that the license
agreement actually restricted Intel's sales.
This author is not aware of any cases involving RTRs and
exhaustion as of December 2009 (probably because most RTRs do
not involve patented product sales37). Indeed, as already stated, only
one case involving the validity of RTRs in any context has made it
into a federal courtroom. Only time will tell how these arguments
will fare.
III. Why RTRs Should Not Be Allowed to Run Afoul of
Exhaustion
Policy will be a key component of the arguments on both sides of
an RTR validity dispute, either under patent or contract law. Aside
from legislation explicitly declaring RTRs unenforceable after a sale
of a patented product, policy may be the only consideration at this
point in time that could effectively put an end to RTRs.
Arguing for RTRs necessarily involves arguing for the value of
tools in general. As patentability is strong evidence that tools are
valued, it is not possible to have a full discussion of the policies
surrounding RTRs without mentioning the policy supporting the
patentability of research tools in the first place. Research tools are
34. See THOMAS J. PARKER, PATENT LICENSING TRANSACTIONS §§ 301, 304
(Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 2009).
35. Hungar, supra note 19, at 533 n.83.
36. Quanta v. LG Electronics, 128 S. Ct. at 2121.
37. Highet, supra note 7.
38. Server, supra note 8, at 90 (discussing Bayer v. Housey, 228 F. Supp. 2d 467(D.
Del. 2002), aff'd, 340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
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unquestionably patentable.3 ' However, the policy underlying the
caselaw is unclear, and tool patents are not explicitly favored or
disfavored by governmental policy pronouncements.
As noted above, most RTR licenses are "use" licenses for
method patents.4  Unsurprisingly, many statements of current policy
and law are implicitly written with method patents in mind.41 One
such method patent is an "assay" tool, which is a method of targeting
a component of a living cell that acts as a switch in controlling a
disease process. More research will be directed to learn what other
molecules can control that switch, and one of those molecules may
eventually become a pharmaceutical. These assays can be patented,
but they are not "sold" as discrete physical products. Instead, the
patentee effectively licenses the ability to do additional research on
the particular cell component identified, through the practice of the
targeting method at issue. For example, although the National
Institutes of Health ("NIH") guidelines name other research tools
which can be sold as discrete physical products, thus triggering patent
exhaustion (e.g., "cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal
models, growth factors, combinatorial chemistry libraries, drugs. . .,
clones and cloning tools (such as "PCR"),... laboratory equipment
and machines...") the guidelines do not mention exhaustion as a
doctrine that would moot any questions of licensing. 42 RTRs on
product sales are likely subject to the same policy restrictions from
both the NIH and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
A. Current Policy
Although the legal landscape tends to answer the question of
what an actor must or can do, the policies of other significant players
help determine what an actor will do. One of the most influential
players in research tool patent licensing is the NIH. Current NIH
policy guidelines for recipients of NIH research funds, largely a
product of former NIH Director Harold Varmus's stance on the issue
with respect to DuPont's Cre-lox genetic engineering system,4 3 frown
39. Server, supra note 8, at 30.
40. Highet, supra note 7.
41. Server, supra note 8, at 25-121.
42. Server, supra note 8, at 25 n.10 (citing NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (NIH) WORKING GROUP ON RESEARCH TOOLS 3 (1998),
available at http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/index.htm).
43. Freundlich, supra note 2. (The "Cre-lox patent" was U.S. patent 4,959,317, which
expired Sept. 25, 2007. The Canadian version expired Dec. 24, 2008.)
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on RTRs.44 Although these guidelines have no legal authority, they
are extremely influential on universities and biotech companies that
depend on NIH grants. A patentee using an RTR for a patent
developed with NIH money may find him or herself unable to secure
further NIH grants. Consequently, a good deal of biotech research
will most likely not be licensed through RTRs.4 5 Whether a
government agency besides the United States Patent and Trademark
Office should be able to influence patent issues directly is another
question, but the fact of this influence is inescapable.
Overall, however, "the NIH has left considerable discretion to
Recipients in determining how to achieve the principle of ensuring
appropriate distribution of NIH-funded tools," and suggests that
"Recipients should engage in such interactions on an infrequent, case-
by-case, and highly controlled and monitored basis." 46
The FDA's policy on RTRs is less clear: "The goal of critical
path research [research moving a laboratory idea to a commercial
drug] is to develop new, publicly available scientific and technical
tools ... that make the development process itself more efficient and
effective . . . . Such tools will make it easier to identify earlier in the
process those products that do not hold promise, thus reducing time
and resource investments, and facilitating the process for
development of medical products that hold the most promise for
patients." 47 The key issue is whether an RTR is incompatible with
"public availability."
Some policy embedded in the Patent Act itself appears to favor
"limit[ing] the reward that may be gained by early stage inventors:"
"'rules requiring a specific use for an invention and limiting the
44. Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts
on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources: Final Notice, 64 Fed.
Reg. 72090 (Dec. 23, 1999).
45. Donald R. Ware, Research Tool Patents: Judicial Remedies, 30 AIPLA Q. J. 267,
292 (2002) ("Based upon an informal survey of university, biotech, and pharmaceutical
company clients, ...the industry trend is moving away from reach-through royalties for
research tools that do not form an integral component of a drug product.... [L]arge
pharmaceutical companies... have [also]adopted strict policies against entering into drug
discovery or other research tool licenses that contain reach-through royalty provisions").
Whether any of these examples are due to the NIH guidelines is unclear.
46. Supra note 44; See also Server, supra note 8, and Kowalski, supra note 1
(supporting the proposition that there is no absolute prohibition on RTRs for NIH funded
tool inventions).
47. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., CHALLENGE
AND OPPORTUNITY ON THE CRITICAL PATH To NEW MEDICAL PRODUCTS 8 (2004),
available at http://www.nipte.org/docs/CriticalPath.pdf.
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protection to that use, other rules relating to the scope of a patent,
rules on blocking patents, and the reverse doctrine of equivalents." 48
A comparison to the policy justifications underlying General
Talking Pictures and Quanta is also informative. If a restriction on
the "right to sell" is accepted as a valid restriction on a sale, then why
are restrictions on use unacceptable? The answer to this question
requires distinguishing the parties in a sale transaction. The Supreme
Court recognized long ago that "licensees 'stand[]on different ground'
from purchasers in authorized sales." 49 The licensees never own the
product, but merely pass it on to the ultimate purchaser.
However, as seen in General Talking Pictures, even a buyer can
be liable for infringement if he or she uses a product purchased in
knowing violation of the licensing agreement between the seller and
the patentee. Is this not effectively a "use" restriction? It can be a
complete use restriction, as well, if the buyer is not supposed to be
able to obtain the product from the licensee at all. In this light, an
RTR, which allows a buyer to use the product at will, as long as he or
she later remits a portion of the sales of his own product, is less of a
use restriction on a buyer than the sales restriction could be. This
alternative interpretation of the effect of sales restriction highlights
that the primary concern of the Court might not be a restriction on
"use" per se. So what exactly is the policy force at work in Quanta?
On the surface, Quanta is purely legal analysis, based on long-
established principles. However, it may also signify a very simple
policy preference by the Court when managing commercial
transactions that implicate patent law: certainty. In this context, the
certainty desired is the clear insulation of a buyer and a licensee/seller
from post-sale infringement liability. The Court discusses the
knowledge of the licensee and the buyer at the time of sale:" if both
parties subjectively understand the sale to be authorized when it takes
place, the sale is forever considered authorized, even if it is
subsequently determined to violate a licensing restriction.
Conversely, to be liable for infringement, the parties must be aware at
the time of sale that they are violators. This sale is forever
unauthorized, and cannot be converted into an authorized sale later.
48. Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 399, 445 n.206 (describing how time, scope, and other aspects of the patent
system strike a balance between the rights of original developers and subsequent
improvers (citing Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual
Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 at 991-93, and 1000-13 (1997))).
49. Hungar, supra note 19, at 535 n.93.
50. Id. at 541.
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This policy preference for certainty should not affect RTRs.
Although they exist to exploit the uncertainty of the worth of
research tools, RTRs do not leave the buyer uncertain as to future
infringement liability. Assuming RTRs are enforceable in patent law
as conditions on sales, the buyer will be aware that his own future
behavior is the only determinant of infringement liability. A violation
of the RTR provision will subject him or her to the same infringement
liability he or she would have for violating any other type of royalty
provision of a licensing agreement where no sale has taken place.
This contrasts with the potential liability if a Quanta-type license were
enforceable at patent law. Such a license "would effectively
transform licensees into insurers of their customers' good conduct,""
over which the licensees have no control. The buyer could also
unwittingly acquire products in violation of the licensing agreement
and still be liable for infringement.
Reiterating the opinions of those who believe Mallinckrodt to be
dead law,52 one scholar speculates that "the Quanta Court's treatment
of [patent exhaustion] case history suggests it may limit the ability of
patentees to limit the transfer of rights" with a use restriction like that
in Mallinckrodt.3 Even assuming that RTRs are not Mallinckrodt-
type use restrictions, a case invalidating RTRs on policy grounds
would seemingly have to deal with facts involving an actual RTR.
RTRs are different enough to make policy analogies from other types
of licensing strategies difficult.
Another recent case with possible policy implications for RTRs
is the unanimous decision of Merck v. Integra.54 The holding of this
case appears to allow drug manufacturers free use of patented
research tools in the process of researching new drug candidates,
using the "reasonably related to the development and submission [of
an application for a new drug]" language from 35 USC §271(e)(1) as a
defense to infringement. At least one commentator believes Merck
did not destroy the enforceability of research tools in all situations,
but that it definitely provides for broad protection of researchers
relatively early in the development pipeline." This suggests the Court
51. Hungar, supra note 19, at 540.
52. Id. at 530.
53. James W. Beard, The Limits of Licensing. 12 UCLA J.L. & TECH., 1 at 43 (Fall
2008).
54. 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
55. Server, supra note 8, at 49, 51 (pointing out that research tool patents, to avoid
§271(e)(1) coverage, would probably need to be used in "'[b]asic scientific research on a
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might look askance at tool manufacturers trying to extract royalties
from these researchers under circumstances other than the most basic
research, even if those researchers are commercial, in-house
employees of a for-profit pharmaceutical company.> This may be
read as the Court's pursuit of a policy supporting early stage
researchers; on the other hand, research tools can be considered the
very earliest stage of research, so perhaps a more precise definition of
the policy would be support of researchers whose goal is a marketable
drug. If this is indeed the policy, RTRs may be in trouble, as they are
aimed squarely at those researchers.
B. Normative Policy
We now turn to more fundamental policy considerations, many
of which suggest that RTRs have positive effects. RTRs can be used
to fill in the gaps between protection of intellectual property and the
economics of the biotech industry. Most importantly, RTRs solve the
problem of valuation of basic research:" "It is the market-place-not
the cost of patenting and developing the [research tool] that
determines [its] value."5 As a negative example, a research tool that
no one wants to use has no value at all, no matter how much money
was spent developing it; thus, a research tool that costs virtually
nothing to create, but has a high value for research, should be worth a
lot. Seen in an absolute sense, "but for the research tool, there would
not have been the end product drug"59  The head of SIBIA
Neurosciences in 1998, Dr. William Comer, said the company "gives
away" its research tools in exchange for later royalties if the recipient
goes on to develop a commercially successful product.6
A tool inventor "solve[s] problems the drug developer either
could not afford or did not find profitable to solve, or did not timely
particular compound, performed without the intent to develop a particular drug or a
reasonable belief that the compound will cause the sort of physiological effect the
researcher intends to induce...' (quoting Merck at 205-06)).
56. Unlike the NIH guidelines, Hatch-Waxman does not provide separate standards
for non-profit vs. for-profit researchers.
57. Kowalski, supra note 1.
58. Id. ("If the basic research tool...cost at most only US$2m to develop and patent
(or less), a reach- through royalty of US$25-300m still may not be excessive
compensation.")
59. Id.
60. Freundlich, supra note 2. SIBIA was acquired by Merck in Nov 1999, and
Comer's tenure as CEO apparently ended around that time, as well. SIBIA's current
licensing practices are unknown.
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solve first,"" or didn't solve as efficiently. Profitability is always a
factor in a "go/no go" drug development decision.2 The efficiency of
the tool could have a huge impact on this profitability factor. The
tool can thus provide a "considerable competitive advantage" to its
63
user.
RTRs probably increase the likelihood of a tool being used, as
well, which benefits the licensee, the licensor, and the public. The
small up front cost for licensees significantly reduces their risk
exposure to the use of a particular tool, versus the risk the licensee
would be taking if it initially paid "full price."6 4 Furthermore, even if
a tool lowers the financial hurdle to create a new product, there is
always the business risk that the licensee will be unable to convert a
seemingly useful final product into a profitable final product. Unlike
other products without licensing arrangements, RTRs effectively
allow licensees to push some of this business risk onto the tool
patentee.6 5 Nothing encourages risk-taking like a reduction of risk, so
allowing such risk sharing should encourage innovation by licensees.
In fact, one analyst claims that biotech pharma has always insisted on
anti-stacking language (see below) in licenses to "patent pending"
research tools in order to shift the risk of patent blocking to the tool
patentee. This risk is significant due to the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office's long prosecution timeline for biotech products."
Additionally, the tool inventor benefits, at minimum, from the
small income stream generated by the licensee's initial use of the tool
under an RTR arrangement. Ultimately, the public will receive the
benefit of a drug that would not have existed otherwise (see above on
tools being a large part of a decision to go ahead with drug
development).
One real-world application of the ability of RTRs to measure the
value of research is that courts have used them to calculate
"reasonable royalty" damages in infringement cases, although this
author is not aware of any cases involving RTRs in the context of
product sales. In explaining current court practice, one commentator
cited cases involving the use of a patented product in the actual
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Server, supra note 8, at 27.
64. Feldman, supra note 48, at 442.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Ware, supra note 45. See also Server, supra note 8, at 112.
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production of the infringer's product, but not the development stage.N
Thus, it is still unknown whether a court might consider an RTR in an
infringement involving a sale of a patented product.
Comparing RTRs to another type of final value determination,
the use of sales of one product to determine the value of another
happens routinely for patented products used in subcomponents of
larger products, such as automobiles. The only difference between
auto parts contracts and RTRs is that in RTRs the "sales" do not
involve products that actually practice or embody the patent, or were
even manufactured using a patented product or method. The
licensed product is used solely to develop the new product, after
which it is never used again.
Of course, there are arguments that cut against RTRs. One of
the most memorable analogies is to a typewriter manufacturer
demanding royalties on an author's book." Perhaps such an
arrangement would be unfair in the case of the typewriter, but in
many biotech examples, the distance between the patented product
and the "author's" new product is much closer than a typewriter is to
a bestselling novel. For example, a researcher using a DNA
microarray to look for a bacterium possessing a certain gene really
isn't doing anything more than using the patented tool: anyone who
read the instruction manual could do it. However, not everyone who
sits down at a typewriter is Shakespeare. Thus, it should be up to the
parties to a private contract to speculate on how much more
"inventiveness" would hypothetically be embodied in whatever
"new" product is developed, and to determine how much financial
value should be attached to this difference.
Opponents of RTRs give little weight to the argument that the
potential financial reward of an invention is the main incentive for its
development, a notion that is one of the basic tenets of the patent
system. Research tools are a fantastic illustration of "why patents are
within the term 'intellectual property.'"7  They are ways of
identifying and using (and thus valuing) the ideas of the mind in the
same way a farmer demarcates and uses his fields.
What happens when there are no RTRs? In the initial stages of
research, where the risk is high, big pharma chooses the "cheap
68. Ware, supra note 45, at 283.
69. Of mice, men, SNPs, targets and other research tools, SIGNALS, Apr. 8, 1998,
http://signalsmag.com/signalsmag.nsf/0/6CD9AC2C39DB5A31882565E0004DC318.
70. Kowalski, supra note 1.
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route" of secretly infringing a tool patent. If nothing ever comes of
the research, the patentee will probably never know about the
violation of its patent. If a new drug is eventually developed, and the
tool patentee wins an infringement suit, a judge might not consider
the final sales of the drug in determining a "reasonable royalty," but
instead may base the royalty on the market for the research tool at the
time of the initial research,72 which might be a very low number in light
of the product's eventual sales. Instead of a licensed patent with an
RTR provision that keeps licensee costs low in the research stage, we
are left with situations like the Hatch-Waxman dispute in Merck. As
one commentator points out, currently "it is the courts deciding which
biotech tools are exempt, which infringers will be the benefactors of
de facto compulsory licensing, and which biotech companies will stay
in business. A better solution is needed."7  RTRs are that solution.
The most vocal proponents of RTRs seem to be those who stand
to recover a windfall profit (tool patentees), while those who oppose
RTRs are parties who may have to pay that profit out
(pharmaceutical producers). However, as shown above, end-product
producers do benefit from RTR schemes. This illustrates a broader
problem: many parties on both sides view RTRs as a zero-sum game.
This view entirely discounts the value of simply doing research at all,
versus doing no research because the necessary tools are unavailable.
When a final product is created, so is new value. Twenty percent of
something is better than 100% of nothing.
C. Opposition
The massive reward garnered by RTRs is only possible through a
government-enforced monopoly. The tradeoff is the exclusion of
those who don't agree to the conditions of practicing the patent (e.g.,
an RTR). Other costs are also borne by society. Because RTRs
make so much sense from the parties' perspectives, the theorized
danger is that they will be agreed to very frequently, thus forcing
costs onto those not party to the transaction.75 The licensor's choice is
71. Id.
72. See discussion of Ware's biotech reasonable royalty factors, supra note 45, at 280.
73. Ruth E. Freeburg, No Safe Harbor and No Experimental Use: Is It Time for
Compulsory Licensing of Biotech Tools? 53 BUFFALO L. REV. 351, 385 (Winter 2005).
74. Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1813, 1818-20 (1984) (cited in Feldman, supra note 48, at 443 n.200).
75. There is some irony in the fact that the other main argument against RTRs is that
no licensees will agree to them, or perhaps even be able to agree to them. See discussion
of the "stacking" problem below.
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likely between zero licensing revenue and a huge payoff, and the
licensee's choice is between no product (which also represents zero
revenue) and a huge payoff, minus a (probably) small percentage.76
Neither party is likely to take the "assured zero revenue" route, no
matter how risky the other option is, making the law the only obstacle
to the transaction. With this in mind, depending on the types of costs
society must pay for RTRs, perhaps some limits should be placed on
their use.
The main policy opposition to RTRs seems to center around
their alleged "anticommons" effect.7 Opposition to these arguments
has also been laid out along doctrinal grounds.' The main point is
that RTRs make it too hard (i.e., costly and slow, with high
transaction costs) for downstream inventors to license upstream tool
patents. The ultimate effect is that "the accrual of too many royalty
slices diminishes potential profit to the point that the company
shouldering the early research and development costs may decide the
drug is not worth the cost of development."' This concept is
commonly referred to as "royalty stacking." As an illustration, Ware
lays out 15 different research tools that a hypothetical researcher
(here, in the proteomics field) would need to use to develop a
product; this means the researcher could potentially be required to
license 15 separate tools before beginning work."
The backstop on too much stacking is that licensors are "keenly
aware that some royalty on an end product is better than no royalty
where there is no end product."" Thus, a stacking problem will tend
to be self-resolving; a licensor that initially insists on a large
percentage of final sales will have to lower its rates if it wants any
license revenue at all. As one biotech executive opined in the late
1990s, "there will have to be equilibrium. It may get to the point
where everyone starts saying 'we won't sign these darn things."'82
76. Feldman, supra note 48, at 447.
77. Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998).
78. Heather Hamme Ramirez, Defending the Privatization of Research Tools: An
Examination of the 'Tragedy of the Anticommons' in Biotechnology Research and
Development, 53 EMORY L.J. 359, 362 (2004).
79. Freundlich, supra note 2.
80. Ware, supra note 45, at 269-70.
81. Kowalski, supra note 1.
82. Freundlich, supra note 2 (quoting Millennium Pharmaceuticals' Chief Business
Officer Steven Holtzman).
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An examination of evidence of the lack of stacking problems
observed in real life RTRs, as well as "anti-stacking" compensatory
measures, also suggests the anticommons effect is not as pronounced
as some fear. A good initial example is the Cohen-Boyer patent.
Though not a true RTR, its license shared the "percentage of the pie"
method of computation that theoretically creates a stacking problem.
The license did not seem to slow down use and the ensuing
development of the biotech industry, which it is credited with
creating, when compared to what could have happened if it was
exclusively licensed, or licensed only for huge upfront fees. This is
the practical licensing choice that companies have: potential for no
money now vs. some money later. At the time the patent expired,
there were 380 licenseesi.
A back-of-the-envelope calculation from an attorney in the field
might be instructive for those concerned about "overrewarding" a
tool inventor. Payback won't typically commence until
approximately the tenth year of the patent term of the research tool
at the earliest, entitling the toolmaker to at most ten years of royalty
payments before encountering the Brulotte limit. The developer of
the ultimate product will therefore have ten or more years of royalty
free yet still patented sales, which could be extended even further
through "evergreening." For example, "the drug developer might
realise a US$1bn per year market for 15 years or US$15bn ... and
have an outlay of reach-through royalties of only [at most] US$100-
300m (at 1-3 per cent [reach-through] royalty)," amounting to at most
a two percent royalty over the lifetime of the drug patent.
Of course, the numbers might not work out so favorably in
specific instances. One example is Millenium Pharmaceuticals, which
served as the "identifier" of drug candidates. After this identification,
Millenium passed the compound on for development by another
company; in the event the compound ever became a commercial
product, Millenium would receive an RTR of 5-15%.'5 During the
identification phase, Millenium routinely assembled approximately
five research tools. Many of the tools were offered by universities,
and an executive of the company claimed the tool RTRs were usually
1/2% to 3% of total sales of an end product. Apparently, Millenium
had to reimburse the tool patentee for the full percentage, even
though it only received 5-15% of total sales. Thus, Millennium could
83. Young, supra note 5.
84. Kowalski, supra note 1.
85. Freundlich, supra note 2.
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have ended up with an effective royalty stack of 25-50% on its
86
revenue.
The example of the Cre-lox patent shows the realistic choice that
patentees have to make when determining the amount of its licensing
fee: namely, between charging a large up-front fee or collecting
royalties later (bearing the risk that later royalties will never
materialize).' The Cre-lox patentee originally planned to charge
$10,000 per institution for use of the technology. In the words of a
company executive, "that went over like a lead balloon . . .
Universities were not willing - or perhaps unable - to make that kind
of commitment to a still basic-stage research tool. They wanted the
chance to play with it in the lab for a while and learn more about its
possibilities." 8 According to the executive, the patentee then offered
an RTR, and in response, "plenty" of organizations agreed to the
license." Reportedly, at least 150 organizations have agreed to
DuPont's terms, "most of them universities and other non-profit
research centers," including Stanford, Harvard, and the Howard
Hughes Medical Institute; in 1998 DuPont said it executed five new
academic licenses per month.") Reflecting self-interest, the limiting
factor on runaway RTRs, as well as the basic motivation of inventors,
he further stated, "We're not out there to strangle [licensees] ....
We just want compensation."
An example from the semiconductor industry shows that
patentees still have to make a choice about the size of their RTRs if
they decide to use this method instead of an up-front fee When the
standard setting organization for 3G wireless technology in Europe
polled its members for royalty rate proposals on "essential" patents
involved in the technology, the cumulative royalty rate was initially
estimated to be 30% of the total price of a 3G phone,9' which would
have drastically reduced the profitability (and with it the widespread
use) of cell phones. However, tool patentees eventually realized that
the lower they price their tools (in terms of percentage of ultimate
86. Id.
87. Feldman, supra note 48, at 447.
88. Naomi Freundlich, Cre-lox controversy divides institutions, prompts NIH panel,
SIGNALS, June 12, 1998, http://signalsmag.com/signalsmag.nsf/0/A91504E7700ED9BO8825
66210046C958 (quoting Robert Gruetzmacher, senior licensing business manager at
DuPont Central Research).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Mark A. Lemley and Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX.
L. REV. 1991, 2026 (2007).
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sales), the more money they stand to gain later on. In order to
determine an appropriate percentage, a tool owner may require an
end-product developer to provide a basic plan for how they plan to
use each tool, but many businesses do this when asking suppliers for
better deals. The leverage for a lower rate can take many different
forms, from future business deals directed to the supplier, to an
opportunity to test the supplier's product in the real world, to free
promotion for the supplier.
How much can a patentee charge through an RTR before the
licensing scheme becomes unviable economically for potential
licensees? An experienced attorney in the field offered hypothetical
rates of 0.5 to 3% for a workable licensing regime.9 These were also
the rates in the Cohen-Boyer licensing terms." An analysis of
SmithKline-Beecham's RTR exposure in the late 1990s showed that
the company was probably paying around 21% of its sales to tool
licensors. 94 The Cre-lox RTR was capped at 25% of royalties," and
the patentee managed to extensively license the tool. Are any of
these examples unreasonable? It is difficult to say for sure, but all
three real-life cases were certainly not examples of failures to license.
Whether it is really a problem or not, there are contractual
solutions to stacking. Kowalski offers the option of variability: the
percentage of the royalty could change over the course of the
licensing period, based on the total RTRs paid to all licensors, or "a
sliding scale royalty rate, i.e. a royalty rate that increases over the life
of the patent or the license such that the royalty rate is lower when
the product is initially introduced and higher . .. after the product has
attained a market."9' Variations in the percentage to be paid could be
a 50% reduction in the event the licensee must pay more than a
certain total RTR amount to all licensors, for example, a figure such
92. Kowalski, supra note 1.
93. Joan Hamilton, Stanford's DNA patent 'enforcer' Grolle closes the $200M book on
Cohen-Boyer, SIGNALS, Nov. 25, 1997, http://www.signalsmag.com/signalsmag.nsf/
657b06742b5748e888256570005cba01 /2d348d68e91004988825655b000b4862?OpenDocume
nt&Highlight=0,cohen-boyer.
94. Is the alliance deck becoming "anti-stacked" against innovators? SIGNALS, May
29, 1998, http://www.signalsmag.com/signalsmag.nsf/0/FFD2CF3F7F7EA56F88256612006
97CE3. (Although the sample calculation at the bottom of the chart does not clearly
represent one particular product, the 21% is offered as an example of the "minimum"
percentage SmithKline could expect to pay.)
95. Freundlich, supra note 88.
96. Kowalski, supra note 1.
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as 3%." Real-life evidence for this exists, as well: "In an analysis
done by ReCap of university/biotech license agreements, about 80%
have anti-stacking language for the benefit of the biotech company,
and most of this language is of the 'fully creditable to floor' variety.
That means the university's take goes from, for example, 5% of net
sales down to a floor rate of 2.5% if the biotech player has to pay
third parties in excess of 2.5% in royalties as well.""
A variation on the sliding scale is a modified "milestone"
payment RTR. Royalties would be paid in lump sums based on a
percentage of sales at certain sales points (e.g., at $1 million and $5
million in total sales). The percentage could rise from an initially
nominal amount, thus allowing a healthy market for the product to
develop before toolmakers start taking their cut. This doesn't always
work, however. "There is anti-stacking language in most of [a major
pharmaceutical company's] agreements, yet in [some] disease
areas ... it's conceivable the potential royalty exposure to net sales of
a given product could exceed 20%."99
This example, along with Ware's hypothetical above,"o pale in
comparison to the potential stacking problem in the semiconductor
industry: an Intel lawyer told one commentator that Intel CPUs are
covered by 5,000 patents." The broad cross-licensing agreement is a
solution to this problem. Although mainly used to lower the risk of
unintentional infringement, a broad portfolio license could also have
the effect of eliminating the stacking problem. The broad license
itself could, of course, contain an RTR provision, but it would be
impossible to calculate. The primary utility of the cross-license is to
save companies from spending immense amounts of time
investigating other inventors' patents. Figuring the actual royalty
amount for a portfolio RTR would involve establishing whether or
not a patent was actually used, which would require the very research
the broad license was used to avoid. Perhaps in the future, biotech
companies will execute broad cross-licensing agreements similar to
those found in the integrated circuit industry.
97. Kowalski, supra note 1.
98. Supra note 95.
99. Id.
100. Ware, supra note 45, at 269-70.
101. Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things To Do About Patent Holdup Of Standards (And
One Not To), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149, 151 (2007).
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Defensive patenting is another possible anticommons danger of
allowing exponential rewards for early-stage patentees.1 2 Another
comparison to the semiconductor industry illustrates this problem and
how RTRs could be a solution instead of a cause. In semiconductors,
the business strategy of "defensive patenting" is the norm;.
companies file as many patents as possible in a given area in order to
lower the future risk of infringement by their products. 104 In order to
keep transaction costs low, companies agree to broad, royalty-free
cross-licenses of their entire patent portfolios.
What if those cross-licenses came with RTRs? Instead of an
RTR on a single research tool, by which a tool inventor could be
"over-rewarded" if a downstream researcher uses that tool to invent a
blockbuster product, the downstream researcher would have access to
every tool the inventor owns in exchange for his RTR obligation on
any products the researcher creates. Surely a percentage of profits in
exchange for the entire productive output of a licensor is a fair trade.
Defensive patenting does seem to be occurring in biotech. As one
law professor stated, "Everybody is filing as many patents as possible
so they have a bargaining chip against being held up by someone
else."1 Perhaps RTRs would be an acceptable solution.
Adherents to the anticommons effect could take solace in the
fact that there is a natural termination of any problem when a patent
expires. This is ensured by Brulotte v. Thys and should assuage any
fears of RTRs persisting indefinitely.1 At the same time, this limit
should not deter licensors; it is unlikely that a licensee would
intentionally wait to sell its product until the patent expired (except
perhaps towards the end of the patent life).
Some of the loudest complaints about stacking come from
proponents of public service. As noted above, the NIH adopted a
policy disfavoring RTRs in 1998. The main policy argument seemed
to be that the difficulty and expense of obtaining research tools
burdened by an RTR made RTRs a poor choice for research tools
developed with public money. In the case of low-cost public-interest
work, one government scientist pointed out their "trouble getting
102. Feldman, supra note 48, at 446.
103. Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations,
90 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1949 (2002).
104. Id.
105. Freundlich, supra note 2.
106. Feldman, supra note 48, at 444.
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companies interested in developing TB or malaria drugs .... You
add stacking royalties onto that and who gets hurt is the public.",1
Interestingly, the NIH guidelines state that when transferring "an
NIH-funded research tool to a for-profit entity that intends to use the
tool for its own internal purposes, recipients [of NIH grant money]
are entitled to capture the value of their invention."10 Perhaps NIH
only meant to protect purely academic research from the supposed
anticommons effect of RTRs; Dr. Varmus' initial motivation for
convening the panel, after all, was his refusal to agree, on behalf of
the NIH, to license a DuPont patent on DuPont's reach-through
terms (which over 150 other entities, many of them academic labs,
had already agreed to).109
There is some inherent contradiction in the NIH guidelines that
lends support to this theory. At one point, the guidelines state that
"[r]oyalties on the sale of a final product that does not embody the
tool, or other reach-through rights directed to a final product that
does not embody the tool discourage use of tools and are not
appropriate in these circumstances."n' However, the guidelines later
state that "[r]oyalties on the sale of final products are more
appropriate to situations where a for-profit entity seeks to
commercialize the tool, e.g., by developing a marketable product or
service, or incorporating the tool into a marketable product or
service." There seems to be an outright prohibition of RTRs that is
later partially withdrawn if the licensee is a "for-profit entity."
Whatever the ultimate policy thrust of the licensing guidelines,
the Cre-lox licensing agreement between NIH and DuPont can be
used for "public interest" research on tuberculosis or vaccines that
are not profitable enough for a for-profit pharma to pursue."' The
RTR provision was essentially dropped in exchange for NIH's
agreement to transfer the technology only to non-profit entities. This
is precisely the situation in General Talking Pictures.
Some who protest RTRs are motivated not by a concern for the
public (as seems to be the case with the NIH and the FDA), but by
107. Freundlich, supra note 88 (quoting Mark Rohrbaugh, the then-director (1998) of
the Office of Technology Development at the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases).
108. Kowalski, supra note 1 (citing 64 Fed. Reg. 72,091 (Dec. 23, 1999)).
109. Freundlich, supra note 2.
110. 64 Fed. Reg. 72,091 (Dec. 23, 1999).
111. NIH and DuPont hammer out Cre-lox agreement, SIGNALS, Aug. 20, 1998,
http://www.signalsmag.com/signalsmag.nsf/0/D74AC16AC20D99C1882566670012D6B7.
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their own desire for financial reward. Large pharmaceutical
companies don't like RTRs, for the obvious reason that they stand to
lose significant amounts of revenue to licensing fees.1 2  One
attorney's personal experience is that "larger, for-profit companies
have [initially] offered miniscule lump sum execution fees that would
barely cover the patent prosecution costs for patent protection for
basic research, only to agree eventually to proper annual payments
and royalties based on a percentage of sales of end product - reach-
through licensing - illustrating that reach-through licensing is indeed
a necessary reality to 'capture the value of . . . invention."""
Ironically, however, biotech pharma has always insisted on anti-
stacking language in licenses to "patent pending" research tools for a
different reason: to shift the risk of patent blocking to the patentee, a
justification already mentioned above.
Bridging academia and private industry, one university professor,
who would seemingly represent the "academic community" regarding
RTRs, but is also the founder of a company that commercialized a
biotech invention, said "I'd rather pay (a company) up front, and then
that's it, rather than take this and if anything comes of it, then have to
pay 20% later.""' This statement represents a contradiction: on one
hand, he'd presumably agree to an RTR on his own product. On the
other, as evidenced by his words, he doesn't want to pay another
patentee an RTR. Many formerly purely academic researchers are
now in the same position thanks to the Bayh-Dole Act, which has
effectively condensed the policy dispute in many cases.
Despite academic opposition to RTRs, universities themselves
use them. One biotech executive said that "we often find ourselves
walking away from licensing in tissue samples or other tools because
the university ... is insisting that if we ever develop a drug using the
tool we have to pay a royalty,"16 which he claims usually runs from
1/2% to 3%.
IV. Conclusion
On balance, RTRs incentivize early-stage biotech inventors by
providing them with the tools they need at a reasonable up-front cost.
112. Supra note 95.
113. Kowalski, supra note 1.
114. Id.
115. Freundlich, supra note 2 (quoting Professor Gerald Rubin of U.C. Berkeley).
116. Id. (quoting Millennium Pharmaceuticals' Chief Business Officer Steven
Holtzman).
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As with any general strategy, RTRs might not always fulfill their
promise in specific situations. Overall, however, they fit well with
current legal concepts, the US patent system, and our capitalist
economy. They also support the national interest in encouraging
further development of biotech.
It seems likely that RTRs will eventually be tested in court and
perhaps some of the arguments discussed here will be used. As
human knowledge expands and the production pipeline for biotech
medicines grows longer and more complex, increased numbers of
inventors will have their hands in the pie. The amount of money
available at the end of the pipeline depends on many factors, but
assuming the power of these medicines grows ever greater ("cure for
cancer in 5 easy pills!"), there will be money, and claimants to it will
soon follow.
